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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nicholas of Cusa and Early Modern Reform: Towards a 
Reassessment  
 
Abstract: Nicholas of Cusa is today widely acknowledged as a seminal thinker of 
modernity.  Yet, in the words of Stefan Meier-Oeser, he still remains a “forgotten 
presence” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Here the theme of the entire 
volume, and especially the multivalent concept of reform employed, will be 
introduced and placed in relation to the existing scholarship on Cusanus and early 
modernity.  The rationale for the section division into theological, ecclesiological, 
perspectival and methodological reform will then be explored.  The introduction will 
conclude with a detailed contextual summary of each of the four sections and the 
papers within them. 
 
Keywords: Nicholas of Cusa, modernity, early modern, perspective, method, theology, 
Church, reform 
 
 
Cusanus and Modernity 
 
Since at least the early twentieth century modern scholars have discovered in the thought of 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64), one of the most brilliant and creative thinkers of the fifteenth 
century, an important key to unlocking the origins of modernity. An enigmatic and paradoxical 
figure straddling the divide between the Middle Ages and emergent modernity, Cusanus was 
in many ways an embodiment of the manifold ideals and tensions of his age. While rooted in 
the piety and Weltbild of Latin Christendom, he was also deeply attuned to the new 
humanistic and scientific spirit of his age. A consummate intellectual, he was also a man of 
action who made his mark on both Church and State, even as he continually struggled for 
their reform. Secure in the certainty of his own faith, his continual striving to bring about “the 
establishment of a new relationship between...the ‘empirical’ and the ‘intellectual’” led him 
to mine the riches of Europe’s classical inheritance and gave him a remarkable openness to 
look for truth beyond traditional boundaries.1  Indeed, his daring attempts to rethink – and 
reconfigure –the relation between the Triune God, the natural world, human society and the 
human individual not only anticipated some of the most important advances of modernity, 
but also, undoubtedly, paved the way for their development.  
                                               
1  Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 
1963), 27.  
Yet the precise nature of Cusanus’ influence on modernity remains a hotly-disputed 
topic.  Broadly speaking, scholarship may be divided into three opposing camps, which bear 
some relation to David Albertson’s recent typology of three overlapping “waves of 
scholarship.”  According to Albertson the first wave (c. 1890-1960) “used seventeenth-century 
science as a backdrop for a prospective reading of Cusanus as forerunner of Kant,” the second 
wave (1950-present) focuses on Cusanus in the context of his own time but within clear 
disciplinary boundaries, while the third wave (1980-present) views Cusanus from a more 
inter-disciplinary perspective.2  It is clear that the first wave will have very definite things to 
say concerning Cusanus’ subsequent influence, but, as we shall see, both the second and third 
waves have also had their impact on framing reception studies.  For our purposes, however, 
instead of three overlapping waves it will make more sense to speak of three relatively distinct 
paradigms: the first views Cusanus not only as anticipating but even accelerating modernity, 
the second views his thought as a kind of accidental modernity, in “Janus-faced” fashion 
looking both backwards to the Middle Ages and forward to early modernity, and the third 
views Cusanus as a proponent, whether consciously or unconsciously, of a kind of alternative 
modernity.  It is to an overview of each of these that we now turn, before considering the 
relation of our own project to them. 
 
Accelerated Modernity 
 
The view of Cusanus as the first modern philosopher was put forward most famously by Ernst 
Cassirer, the great German philosopher and historian of ideas, in his ground-breaking 1927 
work Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance.3  Yet Cassirer was by no 
means the first to link Cusanus with modernity.  As Morimichi Watanabe has shown, the 
origins of modern Cusanus research can be found within nineteenth-century German 
scholarship, especially in Neo-Kantian circles. For philosophers seeking the medieval roots of 
a definitively German intellectual and cultural tradition, Cusanus seemed like an ideal 
                                               
2  David Albertson, “Mystical Philosophy in the Fifteenth Century: New Directions in Research on 
Nicholas of Cusa,” Religion Compass 4 (2010): 5-6. 
3  See Ernst Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Leipzig: B. G. 
Teubner, 1927). 
candidate.4  Important historians and philosophers of this time, including Robert 
Zimmermann, Richard Falckenberg and Heinrich Ritter, were thus all determined, as Jasper 
Hopkins has put it, to find in the German Cardinal a “forerunner of Leibniz.” a “harbinger of 
Kant” and a “prefigurer of Hegel.”5  Indeed, such a view clearly resonated at the time beyond 
Germany.  In 1920, just a few years before the publication of Cassirer’s Individuum und 
Cosmos, Edmond Vansteenberghe’s important biography Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (1401-
1464): L’action – la pensée had sought to place Cusanus not only at the origins of Italian and 
French Renaissance Neoplatonism but also of Hegel and German Idealism.  For 
Vansteenberghe, Cusanus therefore had the right to be called “one of the fathers of German 
thought.”6   
Cassirer too was steeped in this wider German tradition.  His doctoral supervisor 
Hermann Cohen, the leader of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantians, had himself written 
enthusiastically on Cusanus’ philosophy, and especially his mathematics and natural 
philosophy.  In this he made Cusanus a key representative of his own mathematical brand of 
Neo-Kantianism.  Cassirer likewise shared many of these interests.  His PhD dissertation, 
which made reference to Cusanus, was on Descartes’ mathematics, and the opening chapter 
of his 1906 work Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosphie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit 
contained important reflections on Cusanus’ mathematical and scientific works in relation to 
his epistemology.7  Significantly, Cassirer’s Erkenntnisproblem was published just a few years 
before Pierre Duhem’s famous study of Cusanus and Leonardo da Vinci,8 and later, in 
Individuum und Kosmos, Cassirer would cite enthusiastically Duhem’s account of Cusanus’ 
scientific creativity, as well as the opinion of Moritz Cantor, the German historian of 
                                               
4  Morimichi Watanabe, “The Origins of Modern Cusan Research in Germany and the Establishment 
of the Heidelberg Opera Omnia,” in Nicholas of Cusa in Search of God and Wisdom: Essays in Honor 
of Morimichi Watanabe by the American Cusanus Society, ed. Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald 
Christianson (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 17-42. 
5  Jasper Hopkins, “Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464): First Modern Philosopher?” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 26 (2002): 13-14. 
6  Edmond Vansteenberghe, Le Cardinal Nicolas de Cues (1401-1464): L’action – la pensée (Paris, 
1920; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), 282 cited from Hopkins, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 13 n. 
4, 14.  
7  Watanabe, “Origins of Modern Cusan Research,” 26-31. 
8  Pierre Duhem, Études sur Léonard de Vinci II (Paris, 1909), 97-279. 
mathematics, that Cusanus had one of the most gifted and creative mathematical minds of 
the entire fifteenth century.9 
Yet Cassirer’s greatest fascination was with Cusanus’ influence on the Renaissance 
philosophy of mind and freedom, which he saw as directly anticipating the Kantian subjective 
turn in philosophy.  Though he still expressed himself in the scholastic language of the day, 
Cassirer opined that Cusanus’ notion of coincidence brought about a completely novel 
intellectual perspective, wherein the empirical and the intellectual are both radically separate 
and yet immanently conjoined.   In doing so he held that Cusanus denied the medieval 
connection between the realms of heaven and earth, the empirical and intellectual worlds, 
and so “by teaching us to see the One in the other, and the other in the One,” he came to see 
that this (Kantian-like) “separation itself guarantees the possibility of true participation of the 
sensible in the ideal.”10 Significantly, Cassirer held that this epistemological revolution had 
the effect of placing the individual at the centre of all reality as a kind of prototypical Kantian 
subject.  Moreover, in Cusanus’ twin theses of the soul’s (contracted) infinity and its intrinsic 
capacity for self-movement and self-determination, Cassirer saw an anticipation of what he 
provocatively called – in terms which would make Cusanus blanch – the “basic Faustian 
attitude of the Renaissance.”11 
As Michael Moore has argued, Cassirer’s Cusan ressourcement was deeply influenced 
by the cultural and spiritual crisis of German society in the decades before the Second World 
War.12  Written in the very different climate of post-War Germany, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
celebrated Truth and Method, published in 1960, marks another important attempt at 
philosophical reconstruction.  In this work inspired by the mid-twentieth-century 
Heideggerian turn in philosophy and by his own extensive retrieval of the Platonic tradition, 
Gadamer significantly gave considerable attention to Cusanus, whom he portrayed as a 
pioneer in the philosophy of language and a forerunner of his own attempt to reunite 
aesthetics with hermeneutics.13  Four years later, at an international congress in Bressanone 
                                               
9  See Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, 59.  
10  Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, 23-4.  
11  Cassirer, Individual and Cosmos, 69. 
12  Michael Edward Moore, Nicholas of Cusa and the Kairos of Modernity. Cassirer, Gadamer, 
Blumenberg (Brooklyn, NY: Punctum Books, 2013), 54-60.  See also his chapter in this volume. 
13  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans.  William Glen-Doepel (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1979), 393-447. 
(Brixen) with the evocative title Nicolo’ Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno – “Nicholas 
Cusanus at the beginning of the modern world” – Gadamer broadened his perspective, 
offering his own important reflections on Cusanus and modernity.14  While conceding that the 
Neo-Kantian view of Cusanus was “one-sided,” his own views were clearly sympathetic to 
Cassirer.  In particular, Gadamer argued that Cusanus’ accentuation of the Platonic division 
between the realms of the precise and imprecise, with its revolutionary de-centring of the 
Earth, upset the “dogmatic physics” of Aristotle and thus served as “spiritual preparation” for 
the new astronomy and physics.  Likewise, while recognising, unlike Cassirer, that Cusanus’ 
own “Platonic mathematics” was very different in character from that of later thinkers such 
as Galileo, he still insisted that his mathematical reflections on infinity helped bring about the 
“spiritual intuition ... of the continuum” crucial for modern science.15 
Even more important for Gadamer, however, was Cusanus’ conjectural epistemology 
– crucially also founded on the central insight of the distinction between the precise and 
imprecise – which he saw, like Cassirer, but with a sharper critical eye, as clearly anticipating 
aspects of Neo-Kantianism.  In particular, he regarded Cusanus’ doctrine that the quiddity of 
a thing can never be attained in its purity as a fundamental departure from the classical 
doctrine of knowledge that had hitherto prevailed.  In this he argued for the important 
influence of the Nominalist movement upon Cusanus, particularly in their shared insight that 
the conceptual order is not a pre-established given but is created by the mind through its 
dynamic, combinatorial nature.  At the same time, Gadamer was also insistent that in his 
Trinitarian metaphysics of the “creative word” (verbum creans), Cusanus managed both to 
transcend Nominalism and overcome the emanistic temptations of Neoplatonic Realism.16  In 
this, as Michael Moore points out, language gains a luminous quality, “flooding reality and 
making it visible.”17  Language becomes rooted in a “logic of experience,” but at the same 
                                               
14  Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Nikolaus von Kues im modernen Denken,” in Nicolo’ Cusano agli inizi del 
mondo moderno atti del Congresso internazionale in occasione del V centenario della morte di 
Nicolò Cusano Bressanone, 6-10 settembre 1964, ed. Josef Gargitter (Florence: Sansoni, 1970), 39-
48.   
15  Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Nicolaus Cusanus and the Present,” Epoché 7 (2002): 71-9.  Moore, 
Nicholas of Cusa, 62 n. 136 notes that this article was closely related to Gadamer’s 1964 paper at 
the Bressanone congress. 
16  Gadamer, Truth and Method, 393-7 and “Cusanus and the Present,” 77-9.  Gadamer speaks of 
Cusanus as combining Platonic and Nominalist elements but the term transcending seems even 
more appropriate. 
17  Moore, Nicholas of Cusa, 62. 
time still reflects a real ontological order; finally breaking through the Kantian divide between 
the phenomenal and the noumenal.18  To cite Gadamer’s own eloquent words, here “on the 
threshold of modernity, from out of the pathos of a new feeling for life, an ontological truth 
is brought to light, which outstrips even the most extreme height of the modern age.”19  For 
Gadamer, Cusanus is therefore truly – albeit “tacitly” or “unintentionally”20 – modern.  
Indeed, he belongs to that “line of great Classical figures of Western thought who, in the 
passing of the ages, establish for us the one and true.”21  In this sense, Gadamer, recognising 
in Cusanus the seeds of an alternative, Christian modernity – and thus anticipating our third 
paradigm below – goes beyond Cassirer, even as he affirms some of his most important 
insights. 
 
Accidental Modernity 
 
In his classic 1957 work From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, the summation of 
years of reflection on the history of astronomy and metaphysics, Alexander Koyré offered one 
of the most influential accounts of Cusanus and modernity.  Koyré’s portrait of Cusanus is 
complex, fascinating and not a little ambiguous.  On the one hand he can claim that “a new 
spirit, the spirit of the Renaissance breathes in the work of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa,” arguing 
not only that “his world is no longer the medieval cosmos” but also that his “bold assertions” 
go “far beyond anything that Copernicus ever dared to think of.”22  On the other hand he can 
also describe him as the “last great philosopher of the dying Middle Ages,” whose “deep 
metaphysical intuition” was “marred by scientific conceptions that were not in advance of but 
rather behind their time.”23  While he does not say it in so many words, there is a clear sense 
in which Cusanus’ thought represents for Koyré a kind of accidental modernity.  Thus, one 
might say that for him, Cusan metaphysics becomes relevant not as an integral part of the 
scientific revolution – contrary to Duhem, Cassirer and even Gadamer – but rather as an 
                                               
18  Gadamer, Truth and Method, 394-6. 
19  Gadamer, “Cusanus and the Present,” 78-9. 
20  Gadamer, “Cusanus and the Present,” 73 refers to Cusanus becoming “unintentionally” modern 
while Moore, Nicholas of Cusa, 63 interprets this as becoming “tacitly” modern. 
21  Gadamer, “Cusanus and the Present,” 79. 
22  Alexander Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1957), 8, 23-4. 
23  Koyré, Closed World, 6, 19-20. 
important perspective, or vantage point, from which that revolution may be viewed – but 
crucially one that remains firmly embedded in the medieval worldview.24  For Koyré it is 
therefore Bruno, not Cusanus, who is the true representative of the “new astronomy” and 
the “new metaphysics.”25 
In Koyré we clearly see an important prototype for the picture of Cusanus as a “Janus-
faced maverick trapped between the late Middle Ages and the early Renaissance” that has 
become so prevalent in our own time.26  In this he paves the way for Hans Blumenberg, whose 
seminal 1966 work The Legitimacy of the Modern Age was published less than a decade after 
Koyré’s own masterpiece. Like Koyré, Blumenberg was fascinated by Copernican cosmology 
and its complex relation to modernity – indeed, one of his own later works was The Genesis 
of the Copernican World.   However, in Legitimacy his focus is not so much on Copernicus, but 
rather on the “epochal threshold” of modernity, which he sees – again in a manner 
reminiscent of Koyré – as straddled by Cusanus and Bruno.27  For Blumenberg, Cusanus must 
be viewed as standing right on the cusp of the new age, even teetering on its edge.  However, 
he himself always remained unaware of this.  Rather, his own concern, profound but again 
largely unconscious, was to sustain the medieval Christian synthesis, which in the fifteenth 
century was threatening to fall apart due to internal pressure from the rival Realist and 
Nominalist schools and external pressure from Neoplatonic and humanistic currents.  In 
particular, where Nominalism had threatened the divorce of the divine transcendence from 
the divine immanence, Cusanus, through his innovative notion of the coincidence of 
opposites, sought to reunite the two.  Ironically, however, Blumenberg held that in doing his 
best to “save the Middle Ages out of its own material,” he actually prepared the way for its 
final dissolution. For he did not foresee that his own daring attempt to correlate the derivative 
infinity of the universe and the human soul with the original infinity of the divine nature, 
                                               
24  In sharp contrast to Duhem and Cassirer, Koyré is insistent in Closed World, 19 that “in deep 
opposition to the fundamental inspiration of the founders of modern science and of the modern 
world-view, who, rightly or wrongly, tried to assert the panarchy of mathematics, he [Cusanus] 
denies the very possibility of the mathematical treatment of nature.” 
25  See Koyré, Closed World, 35-54 for his fascinating comparison of Cusanus with the “new 
metaphysics” and “new astronomy” of Bruno. 
26  Johannes Hoff, The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eedrmans, 2013), 69. 
27  See Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert Wallace (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1983), 455-596.  This section IV is entitled “Aspects of the Epochal Treshold: The Cusan 
and the Nolan.”  
carried within it the potential to pit rival infinities in this “metaphysical triangle” against each 
other – leading to the end result of an infinite God receding infinitely from an infinite world.28 
Like Gadamer in Truth and Method, which was published only a few years before 
Legitimacy, Blumenberg therefore gave central importance to Cusanus’ relationship to late 
medieval Nominalism.  Yet where Gadamer saw Cusanus optimistically as a pioneer of the 
“creative mind” of the Renaissance and early modernity, Blumenberg was much more 
pessimistic.  For him Cusanus’ thought is ultimately incoherent.  While it prepared the way 
for modernity, it remains trapped in the antinomies and contradictions of the late medieval 
world.  In particular, Blumenberg sees Cusanus as trapped between the Scylla of scholastic 
rationalism (i.e. Realism) and the Charybdis of Nominalism.   Indeed, while at first sight 
Cusanus’ apparent focus on the creative power of the mind might seem to lead out of this 
dilemma, according to Blumenberg it actually shipwrecks on his insistence that all meaning is 
ultimately grounded on the inscrutable decree of the divine will.  In the final analysis man is 
not a true creator – as in Bruno – but merely a quasi-creator or imitator.29  Indeed, it is here 
that we see the real difference from Gadamer, which goes much deeper than the difference 
between optimism and pessimism.  This is that for Blumenberg, Cusanus has only half-broken 
through to the new epoch, and thus remains caught between the Middle Ages and modernity. 
For Blumenberg, Cusanus’ failure was ultimately a failure of mediation.  In positing an 
infinite universe he ended up actually weakening the bond between the world and God, thus 
helping to establish the new, purely immanent sphere of secular modernity.30  In his 
influential Theology and the Scientific Imagination Amos Funkenstein likewise argued that key 
developments in late medieval metaphysics and natural philosophy – specifically the positing 
of the univocity of being and the homogeneity of the universe – led to a kind of domesticating 
of the divine transcendence, in which God became viewed simply as a being among beings.  
As he put it “the medieval sense of God’s symbolic presence in his creation, and the sense of 
                                               
28  Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 483-530.  Blumenberg does not mention humanism explicitly here, but 
the humanist and Neoplatonic thesis of the “dignity of man” is clearly at the forefront of his mind, 
as may be seen from his comparison of Cusanus with the famous Oration of Pico della Mirandola 
(pp. 524-5). 
29  Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 518-38. 
30  Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 538-51 insightfully points to the radical difference between Cusanus’ 
understanding of Christ as the necessary mediating link between the infinite God, infinite world 
and infinite human, and Bruno’s rejection of the Incarnation due to his view that the infinite 
universe is in itself a sufficient embodiment of the divine. 
a universe replete with transcendent meanings and hints, had to recede if not to give way 
totally to the postulates of univocation and homogeneity in the seventeenth century.”31  
While Funkenstein does not devote anywhere near as much attention to Cusanus as Koyré or 
Blumenberg, it is clear that he sees him as occupying an important place in his wider narrative.  
In particular, he suggests that while Cusanus restored the analogical and symbolic reading of 
the universe characteristic of the High Middle Ages, his own provocative notion of the 
unbounded universe only intensified the late medieval process of its homogenization.32 While 
this is in fact a complete inversion of Koyré’s own thesis – which pitted Cusanus’ traditional 
physics against his innovative metaphysics, and not his innovative physics against his 
traditional metaphysics – for our purposes the fundamental point remains the same.  Once 
again then, Cusanus becomes a kind of unwitting staging-post on the road to modernity. 
 
Alternative Modernity 
 
Against those who view Cusanus as either a modern philosopher in medieval garb or a 
conflicted thinker torn between the times, scholars in the third camp have sought to consider 
him as above all a fifteenth-century thinker.  Frequently inspired by the scholarship of 
Albertson’s second and third waves, they view him “less as modern philosopher avant la lettre 
and more as an innovative Renaissance thinker who drew creatively upon medieval 
sources.”33   In doing so they not only provide a valuable critique, or at least tempering, of 
other narratives of Cusanus and modernity – both the Cassiran and the Blumenbergian –but 
they also help to foster an understanding of Cusanus’ thought as a kind of “alternative 
modernity.”   
Key to this approach, as Peter Casarella points out, was Cassirer’s own colleague 
Raymond Klibansky, whose work gave important impetus to the Heidelberg critical edition.  
While Klibansky undoubtedly saw the relevance of Cusanus for modernity, he also argued 
                                               
31  Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination: From the Middle Ages to the 
Seventeenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 116. 
32  Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, 63-70.  Funkenstein himself puts this slightly 
differently seeing Cusanus’ notion of the world as “explication” of God as anticipating the early 
modern, pantheistic, embodiment of God.  However, since he sees this “re-embodiment” of God 
as the origins of secular modernity, the fundamental point remains the same. 
33  David Albertson, “Mystical Philosophy in the Fifteenth Century,” 5-6. 
strenuously for his place within the long tradition of Christian Neoplatonism.  In this way he 
opposed the Neo-Kantian view of him as the “first modern philosopher.”34  However, Rudolf 
Haubst, who significantly stands at the head of Albertson’s second wave, was the first to really 
formulate it explicitly.  Haubst revolutionized the view of Cusanus as a theologian – against 
Kurt Flasch and others who tended him to view him reductively as only a philosopher – and 
was a pioneer in uncovering Cusanus’ medieval sources, but at the same time clearly saw him 
as the “doorkeeper of a new age” (Pförtner der neuen Zeit).  In a memorable image he held 
that Cusanus stood at the threshold of modernity, like a coachman ready to welcome people 
into the new age and providing them with important ideas to help them on their way.35  Yet 
crucially, in contrast to other scholars, Haubst emphasized that Cusanus’ contribution to the 
new age was built explicitly on Trinitarian and Christological foundations.36  In this opinion, as 
we shall see further below, he was joined by Charles Lohr, one of the leading Renaissance 
scholars of his generation. 
As Casarella points out, Haubst’s own view on Cusanus as “doorkeeper” could at times 
be ambiguous.37  By comparison, Louis Dupré’s acclaimed 1993 work Passage to Modernity 
left little room for ambiguity.  Drawing on Henri de Lubac’s controversial Surnaturel, he 
launched a frontal attack on Blumenberg’s thesis.  For Dupré the late Middle Ages and early 
modern period, under the pressure of Scotism and Nominalism, was a time of increasing 
polarisation of nature and grace.  This split he held, made inevitable the modern conception 
of nature as an autonomous, immanent sphere so antithetical to Christian orthodoxy.  
According to him Cusanus’ Neoplatonic metaphysics, with its binding of immanence to 
transcendence and nature to grace, represented the only possible route out of this impasse.  
In this sense he regards his dialectical thought as the “last major alternative” to the dualist 
theologies of early modernity.38 
                                               
34  Peter Casarella, “Nicholas of Cusa and the Ends of Medieval Mysticism,” in The Wiley-Blackwell 
Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. Julia Lamm (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 392-3. 
35  Rudolf Haubst, Nikolaus von Kues, “Pförtner der neuen Zeit” (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1988) cited 
from Casarella, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 393. 
36  See Rudolf Haubst, Das Bild des Einen und Dreieinen Gottes in der Welt nach Nikolaus von Kues 
(Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1952) and Die Christologie des Nikolaus von Kues (Freiburg: Herder, 1956); 
and Streifzüge in die cusanische Theologie (Münster: Aschendorff, 1991). 
37  Casarella, “Nicholas of Cusa,” 393. 
38  Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 57-61, 167-89.  Dupré does not cite de Lubac but is clearly 
drawing on his The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Crossroad 
Dupré’s account of Cusanus as representing an “alternative modernity” has proven 
extremely influential and has subsequently been taken up by other scholars and developed 
in new directions.  One of the most important of these accounts can be found in Karsten 
Harries’ impressive 2001 work Infinity and Perspective.  Without rejecting Blumenberg’s 
comparison between the Cusan and the Nolan, Harries redirects our attention to Cusanus and 
his contemporary Leon Battista Alberti, the famous pioneer of perspective, as founders of two 
very different kinds of modernity.  According to Harries while Cusanus was able to hold 
together within the horizon of the divine infinity a multitude of individual human 
perspectives, Alberti’s absolute privileging of one-point perspective led to a disruption of the 
participatory relation between finite and infinite, fueling the perspectivalism of Descartes and 
Kant and preparing the way for the nihilism of Nietzsche.39  In her Immanence of the Infinite 
– a major critique of Blumenberg – Elizabeth Brient develops the views of Harries, her former 
teacher, and Dupré in arguing that Cusanus alone was able to hold together the relation of 
immanence and transcendence.  At the same time, in a manner reminiscent of Gadamer, she 
sees Cusanus as seeking to ground a distinctively modern notion of the mind’s infinite capacity 
to transcend itself within a traditional Neoplatonic and Christological framework – and thus 
once again as reaching towards a kind of alternative, explicitly theological, modernity.40 
In recent years the work of John Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy school has taken 
up and developed both Dupré’s de Lubacian thesis and Harries’ perspectival thesis in new 
ways.   For Milbank, Cusanus played a crucial role in radicalising – and thus saving – Aquinas’ 
analogical metaphysics from late medieval attacks.  In doing so he sees him as explicitly 
representing an alternative Christian modernity, founded on analogy and open to infinite 
transcendence, contrasting sharply with the self-enclosed sphere of secular modernity with 
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its roots in Scotus’ univocity of being.41  Developing this, Johannes Hoff’s 2013 work The 
Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa presents an ambitious synthesis, 
which not only combines Milbank’s focus on analogical metaphysics with Harries’ account of 
perspective, but also extends this into a critical comparison of Cusanus with Descartes, 
Leibniz, Kant and the entire tradition of German Idealism and Romanticism.  Against Scotus, 
Alberti and all their early modern successors, Hoff clearly sees Cusanus as offering “an 
alternative modernity that enables us to recover the pre-modern middle path between 
univocity and equivocity without losing sight of the emancipatory legacy of the modern 
age.”42 
 
Reception Studies of Cusanus 
 
For scholars seeking to trace Cusanus’ concrete influence on early modern thought, and not 
only to map his broader affinities with key currents of modernity, a number of problems 
immediately present themselves.  From the evidence of three major editions of Cusanus’ 
Opera Omnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and quite a number of further editions 
and translations of his works thereafter, it is clear that there was a definite early modern 
demand for his work.43  Nevertheless, despite his considerable influence on a number of 
major fifteenth-century debates, it has proved surprisingly difficult to follow the path of his 
influence into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  One of the principal reasons for this, 
as many scholars have suggested, is that Cusanus left no school behind him to consolidate 
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and propagate his work.44  As a result his influence was often fragmentary, and there was a 
tendency for rather an eclectic reception of his thought. Indeed, as Hans Gerhard Senger 
notes, it is this fact that misled a whole generation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
scholars into thinking that Cusanus’ actual influence on early modern thought was 
negligible.45 
An important step towards reassessing Cusanus’ early modern influence was the 1964 
Bressanone congress.  From this congress we gain some insight into the status of reception 
studies just two years before the publication of Blumenberg’s Legitimacy of the Modern Age.  
As well as Gadamer’s piece, this contained important individual studies relating to Reuchlin, 
Luther and Bruno.  However, most relevant for us was Günter Gawlick’s essay on the 
reception of Cusan ideas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While Gawlick 
significantly saw “manifold bridges” between Cusanus’ own thought and the systems of later 
philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Hegel, his own focus was on mapping explicit 
citations, whether positive or negative, of Cusan ideas in the early modern period – an 
enterprise he noted that, astonishingly, no one up until that moment had undertaken  His 
own endeavours to this end are necessarily modest in scope, and largely focused on 
astronomical topics, yet they are important as providing a first hint of the richness and 
diversity of Cusanus’ early modern reception.46  
Stephan Meier-Oeser in his Die Präsenz des Vergessenen has written the only exclusive 
reception history of Cusanus, tracing Cusanus’ philosophical impact on a range of influential 
authors of the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries. For Meier-Oeser, Cusanus’ forgotten 
presence is also, ironically, the presence of that which has been forgotten. That is to say, those 
who appropriated Cusan thought in this period often modified what they discovered there 
and even sometimes failed to see the coincidence of opposites as coincidence. Thus, Cusanus 
was often labelled as a theologian and relegated to an interpreter of Dionysian mystical 
theology rather than a philosopher. Others mined his mathematical conclusions for their own 
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purposes. Mersenne, for example, used Cusa’s Koinzidenzlehre, not as a medium for a 
metaphysic of unity, but primarily as an aid for lending certainty to the discipline of theology 
and rendering it more persuasive.47 Some even attempted an abridgment of Cusanus’ idea of 
learned ignorance by blending it with earlier Augustinian versions of antithesis.48 Despite 
these conclusions regarding the presence of the forgotten Cusanus, Meier-Oeser’s discoveries 
open an important ‘forgotten’ window into Cusanus’ influence in the early modern world.  
Since Meier-Oeser there have been no further attempts to offer anything like a 
comprehensive account of Cusanus’ early modern influence.  Yet this does not mean that he 
should be taken to have said the last word on the topic.  Rather, as Hans Gerhard Senger 
suggests, Meier-Oeser’s work should be taken as an invitation for further dialogue.49  Indeed, 
while his impressive study remains the necessary starting point for all research in this area, 
and a principal inspiration for this volume, he himself was well aware of its relatively narrow 
focus and the need for much more in-depth study of many of the individual thinkers 
presented in his volume. It is this contextual gap which has been filled by subsequent 
scholarship.  As a result, we now have a much better picture of the various  contexts in which 
Cusanus’ thought was received.  At the same time there have been no lack of larger projects, 
which, although much less ambitious than Meier-Oeser’s in scope, have undoubtedly thrown 
new light on Cusanus and early modernity. 
Following Meier-Oeser, Karl-Hermann Kandler offered in 1997 a brief but helpful 
account of Cusanus’ early modern reception in his aptly named Nikolaus von Kues. Denker 
zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit. While largely derivative this does present his own important 
research on Cusanus’ influence on Luther and Lutheranism, highlighting Jacques Lefèvre 
d’Étaples as an important mediating figure between Cusanus and early modernity – a point 
we shall return to below.50  Even more significant is Senger’s 2002 work Ludus Sapientiae: 
Studien zum Werk und zur Wirkungsgeschichte des Nikolaus von Kues.  Like Kandler, Senger’s 
account of Cusanus’ influence is also largely derivative, yet it stands out as offering a carefully 
reasoned, philosophical, account of what it actually means to talk about “reception history” 
(Wirkungsgeschichte).  In particular, against rather vague or nebulous accounts of “influence,” 
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Senger emphasises the need to establish clear channels of mediation between Cusanus and 
early modernity – something that will be a primary focus of this volume.51 
Since Senger a number of important companion volumes to Cusanus have appeared.52  
For our purposes the most important of these is the 2012 compilation Cusanus: A Legacy of 
Learned Ignorance edited by Peter Casarella.  Casarella is profoundly influenced by Louis 
Dupré and, in the spirit of our third paradigm, this volume therefore seeks to offer “a detailed 
historical background to Cusanus’ thinking while also assaying his significance for the 
present.”  Although it does not have a distinct early modern focus it does contain important 
essays by Harries on Alberti and Cusanus, Brient on mathematics, Bernard McGinn on 
mysticism and Wilhelm Dupré on Cusanus and “world formation” –indisputably one of his 
most important early modern philosophical legacies.53 
A different kind of companion volume may be seen in the plethora of works edited by 
Harald Schwaetzer and his research group.  Of these Das europäische Erbe im Denken des 
Nikolaus von Kues: Geistesgeschichte als Geistesgegenwart seeks to trace important 
European dimensions of Cusanus’ thought, while the Nikolaus Cusanus: ein 
bewundernswerter historischer Brennpunkt: philosophische Tradition und wissenschaftliche 
Rezeption highlights Cusanus’ thought as a key focal-point in the philosophical tradition.54  
However, undoubtedly the most important recent work on Cusanus and modernity is the 
impressive, but eclectic, 2014 compilation Die Modernitäten des Nikolaus von Kues: Debatten 
und Rezeptionen edited by Tom Müller and Matthias Vollet.  Like Schwaetzer’s compilations, 
this contains a number of important articles on Cusanus in the context of early modern art, 
especially Van Eyck, Alberti and Dürer, as well as interesting reflections on his influence on 
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alchemy, atomism and mathematics.55   Perhaps most notable for our purposes is an essay by 
Fréderic Vengeon, which describes Cusanus as instrumental in the “metaphysical renewal of 
the human world.”56  Significantly, this is the primary theme of another even more recent 
work dealing with Cusanus’ modernity, the 2016 Nicolas de Cues (1401-1464), Le tournant 
anthropologique de la philosophie edited by Hervé Pasqua, in which his legacy as “last of the 
medievals and first of the moderns” is thoroughly explored.57  While approached from a 
different angle, this theme of the metaphysical reform of the human world, understood in 
multiple dimensions, remains central to our volume. 
 
Cusanus and Early Modern Reform 
 
Thus while a host of eminent scholars have all recognised Cusanus as a central figure in the 
story of modernity, it is clear that the precise nature and character of his influence has proved 
much harder to pin down, and in fact remains highly contested.  At the same time, it should 
also be clear that while very valuable work has been done in tracing Cusanus’ legacy into the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there still remains much more to be done before 
anything like a complete picture can be given.  In Meier-Oeser’s evocative phrase Cusanus 
still remains something of an elusive and “forgotten presence” in the early modern world. 
Our volume Nicholas of Cusa and Early Modern Reform seeks to bring Cusanus out of 
the shadows.  To attempt a comprehensive study of his legacy, even confining the scope to 
the early modern period, would require far more than a single volume – something which 
itself bears ample testimony to the importance of this topic.   Instead, following consciously 
in the footsteps of Gerhart Ladner, our volume seeks to use the potent and multi-faceted 
notion of reform to shine new light on Cusanus’ relationship to early modernity. 
In his classic work, The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in 
the Age of the Fathers, Gerhart Ladner focuses on the Christian concept of reformatio and 
renovatio ad imaginem Dei as the image and icon by which followers of Christ refocus and 
reformulate their individual and corporate lives in Christ through the Holy Spirit. According to 
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Ladner, the fundamental transformative realities of “reformatio-renovatio and imago or 
similitudo Dei were never lost” throughout the Middle Ages.58 Ladner concentrates especially 
on the idea of reform in St. Augustine of Hippo.59 In the theology and ecclesiology of 
Augustine, Ladner posits that Western Christian understandings of reform and renewal 
revolve on the axis of Christ’s Passion and Crucifixion, and radiate away from the earlier Greek 
idea of Christocentric recapitulation.60 There is a salvific shift from returning to primordial 
origins toward realizing the fullness of the infinite Christ in finite personal and social reality 
that both inhabits the flux of dissimilitude and transcends temporal notions of personhood 
and politics. Thus, Augustine’s Confessions navigate the personal journey of rest in God and 
the cosmic exitus-reditus of all things being made new in Christ.61 In The City of God, Augustine 
traces the ages (aetatum) of God’s providence and the tension between the city of humanity 
and the city of God, as well as the subsequent capacity for moral action in the intrepid 
interplay of nature and grace between Christians living in, with and under both realms.62 
Charles Norris Cochrane states that Augustine “bears witness to the faith of Christians that, 
notwithstanding all appearances, human history does not consist of a series of repetitive 
patterns, but marks a sure, if unsteady, advance to an ultimate goal.”63 Ladner concludes his 
discussion of Augustine’s theology of reform by stating, “Through St. Augustine’s whole life 
there runs the search for a perfect communal or societal way of Christian life.”64  
Thus, when Cusanus writes about reform in De concordantia catholica, it is for the 
renewal of the Church and society within Christendom and steadying the sacred balance of 
heaven and earth, eternity and time as realized in the body of Christ.65 For Cusanus, the 
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substance and shape of reform were thoroughly Christocentric.66 F. Edward Cranz observes 
that Cusanus applies Augustine’s Platonic-Chrisitan philosophy-theology of reform-renewal 
univerisally.67 Indeed, as Cranz writes, “Nicholas sees all human society in terms of 
Augustine’s Christian city of God, and so he works to establish in it the concord which reflects 
the concord of the Trinity.”68 More recently, and attesting to the influence of the ideas of 
personal and public reform on this, the five-hundredth anniversary of the beginning of the 
Reformation, Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age transmits Christian understandings of finding 
personal and cultural fullness within the immanent frame, as well as tracing the porous 
transmutations of spirituality in self and society over the last half millennium.69 Christian ideas 
of renewal and reform in the reformations of the sixteenth century and the early modern 
period inherited, inhabited and interrogated Augustine’s Christ-centered reform both of the 
corporate church and of the individual believer in society, and influenced conceptualizations 
of being and time from Cusanus to Heidegger and beyond.70   
Within the ongoing interplay of ideas on modernity and reform, our volume focuses 
on four major thematic areas – the reform of Church, the reform of Theology, the reform of 
Perspective, and the reform of Method – which together aim to encompass the breadth and 
depth of Cusanus’ own reform initiatives.  In particular, in examining the way in which he 
served as inspiration for a wide and diverse array of reform-minded philosophers, 
ecclesiastics, theologians, and lay scholars in the midst of their struggle for the renewal and 
restoration of individual, society, and world, our volume seeks to combine a focus on Cusanus 
as a paradigmatic thinker with a study of his concrete influence on early modern thought.  In 
doing so our volume embraces all three aspects of Cusanus’ heritage, seeking to view him in 
the kaleidoscope of accelerated, accidental and alternative modernities which together 
provide a comprehensive vision of early modernity. 
 
PART I. Reformatio Generalis: Reform of Church 
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 From his first major treatise, De concordantia catholica (1433-34), to his Reformatio generalis 
(1459),  penned just five years before his death, Nicholas of Cusa was an ardent reformer of 
the Church.  Morimichi Watanabe surveys the conciliarist De concordantia catholica within 
the spectrum of Church reform stretching back to the middle ages and early Church.71 
Watanabe also surmises that “the problem of Church reform was a central one throughout 
his active life.”72 Thomas Izbicki notes that the Reformatio generalis is “a substantial 
contributon to reform thought.”73 Throughout Cusanus’ mutlifaceted writings and varied 
Church work, as Brian Pavlac observes, “at the heart of his activities was reform of Church.”74 
Scott Hendrix comments that the ecclesiology of Nicholas of Cusa can help answer the 
recurring question of whether the Reformation of the sixteenth century was something new 
or a continuation of the medieval search for reform.75 In commemoration of the five-
hundreth anniversary of the Reformation, the opening section of this volume examines 
Cusanus’ long career as Church reformer and his enduring influence on early modern Church 
reform. 
Thomas M. Izbicki and Luke Bancroft’s essay, “A Difficult Pope: Eugenius IV and the 
Men around Him,” recounts and reviews the relationship between Cusanus and Pope 
Eugenius IV as it relates to Church reform.  Nicholas of Cusa became known as the Hercules 
of the Eugenian cause, supporting Eugenius IV against the Council of Basel. Eugenius had at 
first been closely allied with Rome’s Orsini clan and served mostly by fellow Venetians. By the 
time he returned to Rome in late 1443 Eugenius had come to welcome into his circle of 
advisors a broad cohort whose various skills and perspectives proved invaluable in the 
struggle to win back authority for a papacy that was at one time threatened on all fronts. 
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Izbicki and Bancroft detail how Eugenius discovered during a troubled reign the need to 
employ Cusanus, rather than just relying on Orsini clients and natives of the Veneto. Izbicki 
and Bancroft also observe how Cusanus’ service to Eugenius did not prevent him from 
seeking, often in vain, the reform of Church and Curia.  
In “The Reform of Space for Prayer: Ecclesia primitiva in Nicholas of Cusa and Leon 
Battista Alberti,” Il Kim examines how Cusanus’ Reformatio generalis, a proposal for change 
in the entire church in 1459 on the eve of the Reformation, also shaped liturgical 
space.  According to Kim, for Cusanus this meant the restoration of the original, primitive 
principles of the Apostles’ Church (ecclesia primitiva).  Although the idea itself was a 
prevailing theme in the mid-fifteenth-century curia in general, Cusanus devised a plan by 
which to achieve it, which included simple places for devotion.  Concurrently, in his De re 
aedificatoria (1440s-1472) Alberti expressed his support for reform and proposed a return to 
a more austere Church interior, which was in line with Cusanus’ theological approach and 
with the new, monochromatic interior style developed in Florence.   
Richard J. Serina also examines Cusanus’ Reformatio generalis in his “‘Papista 
Insanissima’: Papacy and Reform in Nicholas of Cusa’s Reformatio Generalis (1459) and the 
Early Martin Luther (1517–19).” Serina compares Luther’s writings from the nascent 
indulgence controversy with the Reformatio generalis. While it is unquestionable that by the 
time of the Leipzig Debate Luther’s opinions on papal authority and the prospects for reform 
had taken a new, irrevocable direction, Serina assesses Luther’s earlier writings in connection 
with Cusanus to underscore the common ground they share in their diagnosis of problems 
within the Roman curia, the possibility of papal reform, and the consequences of that reform 
for the bene esse of the Church.  
In the final essay in this section on reform of Church, “Nicholas of Cusa and Paolo Sarpi: 
Copernicanism and Conciliarism in Early Modern Venice,” Alberto Clerici argues that the main 
link between Sarpi and Cusanus is conciliar theory. According to Clerici, the political and 
intellectual debates over the Venetian Interdetto led to a European-scale dispute between 
Sarpi and Cardinal Bellarmine, opposing two different ways of interpreting the need for a 
Catholic Reformation, and demonstrating the strong ties between late medieval conciliarism 
and early modern constitutionalism, thereby exbibiting the early modern expanse of Cusanus’ 
influence as Church reformer. 
 PART II. Coincidentia Oppositorum: Reform of Theology 
 
Cusanus’ conception of the concidentia oppositorum is directly related to his theological 
vision and method of learned ignorance.76 The structure and substance of De docta ignorantia 
is Christological.77 Thus, for Cusanus, the counters and content of his concept of the 
coincidence of opposites is ultimately Christ-centered. Furthermore, unity in diversity, as 
found for Cusanus par excellence in the person of Christ, is also the motivation and mode of 
his reform of theology. Thus, the Reformatio generalis is not only a practical proposal for 
Church reform but also a profound meditation on ecclesial unity between diverse members 
of the mystical body of Christ.78 For Cusanus, Christ is both the body (ontological) and example 
(moral theology) of and for the Church, and Christ is the very “glue” (glutino Christi) that binds 
the Church as one.79 Furthermore, Christ, for Cusanus, is the ultimate reformer, the way by 
which one is led by word (Logos, Verbum) and example (Christiformes) away from sin and 
ignorance to the contemplation of God, the goal of theology.80 The essays in this section 
survey Cusanus as a Christ-centered reformer of theology in light of the Protestant 
Reformation’s adherence to the foundational principle of solus Christus. These essays 
compare Cusanus’ Christocentric and Trinitarian theology and method of learned ignorance 
with the seemingly opposite Christology and Trinitarian theology of the magisterial reformers 
Luther and Calvin, thereby presenting novel coincidental appraisals in historical theology.  
They also mark the influence of Cusanus’ theocentric formula complicatio-explicatio and the 
underlying unity of all things upon early modern Roman Catholic theology.  
In the first essay in this section, “Nicholas of Cusa and Martin Luther on Christ and the 
Coincidence of Opposites,”  Joshua Hollmann examines Cusanus’ theological method of 
learned ignorance and the corollary Christocentric coincidence of opposites in light of Luther’s 
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fundamental teaching on Christian liberty and justification by faith alone through Christ alone. 
While theological differences remain, Hollman contends that Cusanus’ theology and 
theological method of Christ and the coincidence of opposites bear striking similarities to the 
coincidental Christology of Luther’s The Freedom of a Christian, thereby proposing a new 
perspective on the importance of Christology and the coincidence of opposites in Luther and 
pre-Reformation thought. 
From Luther our volume moves to Calvin. Gary Jenkins’ “Ignorantia Non Docta: John 
Calvin and Nicholas of Cusa’s Neglected Trinitarian Legacy” notes how Cusanus’ 1453 treatise 
De visione Dei, written as an exercise in mystical theology, marks a final stage in Cusanus’ 
Trinitarian theology, one developed from his initial statements in De docta ignorantia. 
According to Jenkins, far from being based on a mere reworking of Latin Trinitarianism, 
Cusanus demonstrates a detailed and imaginative theology that is at once Augustinian and 
Dionysian. Jenkins observes that this presents a strange legacy for Cusanus in subsequent 
thought: since most of the Reformers rejected Dionysius’ hierarchical theology, they would 
blatantly disdain Cusanus’ ecclesiology in De concordantia catholica; and since they held to 
the medieval inheritance of God as first actus purus they could never extricate themselves 
from the interminable debates about relationships within the Trinity.  
In the final essay in this section, “Nicholas of Cusa and Pantheism in Early Modern 
Catholic Theology,” Matthew Gaetano traces Cusanus’ influence on the Catholic/Counter-
Reformation. Although Johann Wenck and some nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars 
associated Nicholas of Cusa with pantheism, major Roman Catholic theologians in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries embraced Cusanus’ view of the relation of the world to 
God. Indeed, as Gaetano examines, Théophile Raynaud, a learned Jesuit theologian, saw his 
doctrine of God as the complicatio or enfolding of all things as useful for opposing medieval 
pantheists like David of Dinant and Amalric of Bena. Gaetano’s essay argues that Johann Eck, 
Théophile Raynaud, and Louis Thomassin drew upon Cusanus’ teaching on God as enfolding 
all things and other elements of his thought in their renewal of early modern Catholic 
scholastic theology. 
 
PART III.  Explicatio Visionis: Reform of Perspective  
 
The chapters in the third section explore the reform of perspective between Cusanus, 
Giordano Bruno and the Cambridge Platonists. Cusanus’ method of learned ignorance relies, 
as Karsten Harries explains, on “the principle of perspective,” that is, on the recognition that 
human knowledge is perspectival by nature, as it always occurs within the purview of an 
infinite Other.81 For Cusanus, God’s self-knowledge functions as the Measure of all being, a 
measure to which only God himself has direct and immediate access. Our knowledge, 
originating in our reflection of the divine image, is mediated, limited, and conjectural, and 
therefore, our access to what is ultimately real is intrinsically perspectival. Though our mind 
(mens) is incapable of measuring (mensurare) the infinite circle of reality by discursive reason 
alone, the very fact that we can know and speak about the reality of an infinite perspective 
beyond our own reveals “an intuition of the translinguistic.”82 
To recognize the limitations of finite knowledge and its inability to satisfy our desire 
for an infinite Good provokes us to get behind the “wall of coincidence.” By the use of 
intuition or self-reflection, we are capable of viewing the minimum and the maximum 
measures as a pair of united lenses, through which we can analyze and take some measure 
of the immeasurable. This intuitive vision of coincidence enables us to leap beyond the 
opposing perspectives of identity and otherness and to see ourselves and all things coinciding 
in the divine perspective.83 Like Copernicus’ revolutionizing of the visible world, Cusanus 
redefined human perspective by placing the finite universe within infinity – with Christ, in 
whom the finite and infinite perfectly coincide, at the center. And so, for Cusanus, any “vision 
of reform” requires a “reform of vision,” a new perspective with a new pair of intellectual 
eyeglasses.84 Cusanus put this method into practice in his proposed ecclesiastical and 
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82  Harries, Infinity, 52. 
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84  Inigo Bocken, “Visions of Reform: Lay Piety as a Form of Thinking in Nicholas of Cusa,” in 
Reassessing Reform: A Historical Investigation into Church Renewal, ed. Christopher M. Bellitto 
and David Zachariah Flanagin (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 216. 
communal reforms, seeking peace by reducing societal differences to their highest 
abstraction in their underlying unity.  
 Cusanus’ reform of perspective denotes what Cassirer terms “a totally new intellectual 
orientation” (veränderten geistigen Gesamtorientierung), which bears the potent ial for 
engendering radical concepts of reform.85 Giordano Bruno and the Cambridge Platonists also 
sought the reform of perspective, yet in ways that would push (and sometimes break) the 
doctrinal bounds of Christianity. Scholarship on Bruno has long noted his indebtedness to 
Cusanus’ coincidence method, which provided him with the motive to radically collapse the 
traditional distinction between divine and human perspectives.86 Bruno radicalized Cusanus’ 
method by coupling it with his philosophical rejection of Trinitarianism, resulting in the 
conclusion that the “world” rather than the divine “Word” signifies the “absolute self-
realization of divine onmipotence,” as Blumenberg notes.87  
The Cambridge Platonists – Benjamin Whichcote, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, John 
Smith, Peter Sterry, Nathanael Culverwel, and Anne Conway – in their opposition to the 
perceived atheism of Hobbes, Spinoza, and others, strove to see “Reason re-enthroned in her 
Majestick Seat” within religion, though not to such a radical degree as Bruno.88 Together the 
Cambridge Platonists upheld the heart of Trinitarian religion in the rationalistic spirit of 
Origen, with More and Sterry positing the preexistence of the human soul in the divine being 
and the ultimate salvation and restoration of all things (apokatastasis) in Christ and Cudworth 
seeking philosophical basis for the Christian Trinity in the Neoplatonic triads of Plotinus.89 As 
Cassirer notes, the Cambridge Platonists were instrumental in bringing about a “Platonic 
Renaissance” in England that would have important implications for the development of 
                                               
85  Ernst Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos, 29.  
86  See, for instance, Felice Tocco, “Le fonti più recenti della filosofia del Bruno,” Rendiconti della R. 
Accademia dei Lincei (Rome: Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 1892), I:538-612; 
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87  Hans Blumenberg, Legitimacy, 564.  
88  Ralph Cudworth, A sermon preached to the honourable Society of Lincolns-Inne (London: J. Flesher 
for R. Royston, 1664), 38; Douglas Hedley, “Real Atheism and Cambridge Platonism: Men of 
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89  On Origen and the Cambridge Platonists see the chapters by Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton in 
Autonomie und Menschenwürde: Origenes in der Philosophie der Neuzeit, ed. Christian 
Hengstermann and Alfons Fürst (Münster: Aschendorff, 2012); On Cudworth and the Trinity see 
Benjamin Carter, ‘The Little Commonwealth of Man’: The Trinitarian Origins of the Ethical and 
Political Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth (Louvain: Peeters), 2011. 
modern philosophy.90 Indeed, John Muirhead makes the somewhat exaggerated claim that 
Cudworth is the “real founder of British Idealism.”91 In more concrete terms, their influence 
on Newton, Locke, Leibnitz, Herder, Coleridge and others has received scholarly treatment.92 
Cassirer remarks on the resemblance of their thought to Cusanus, particularly in their 
combination of subjective and objective perspectives within religion.93 James Bryson has 
proven Cassirer’s supposition about Cusanus’ influence on the Platonic Renaissance in 
England to be true, namely, that Cusanus did exercise some influence on the Oxford 
predecessor of the Cambridge theologians, Thomas Jackson.94 No study of the Cambridge 
Platonists, however, has analyzed their thought vis-à-vis Cusanus in any detail.  
There are many notable parallels between Cusanus and the Cambridge Platonists, 
partly due to their deep emergence in Neoplatonic sources as well as the influence of Rene 
Descartes (himself a reader of Cusanus) on the Cambridge Platonists (Henry More and Ralph 
Cudworth in particular).95 Their interest in the reform of perspective manifests itself in many 
of their ideas:  the idea that Reason is “the Spirit of Man,” which is the “Candle of the Lord” 
and the essential mechanism of human deification;96 an exemplarist metaphysics coupled 
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49.3 (1988): 511-518; On Locke see G.A.J. Rogers, “Locke, Plato, and Platonism,” in Platonism at 
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Hampton, “An English Source of German Romanticism: Herder’s Cudworth Inspired Revision of 
Spinoza from ‘Plastik’ to ‘Kraft’” The Heythrop Journal, published 14 July 2015, 
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Coleridge, Philosophy, and Religion: Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 34-40. 
93  Cassirer, Platonische, 22.  
94  James Bryson, The Christian Platonism of Thomas Jackson (Leuven: Peeters, 2016), 109-155.  
95  On Cusanus and Descartes see Karsten Harries, “Problems of the Infinite: Cusanus and Descartes,” 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64.1 (1990): 89-110.  
96  See Robert A. Greene, “Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and Synderesis,” Journal of the History 
of Ideas 52.4 (1991): 617-44.  
with an autonomous ethic;97 the criticism of Aristotelian faculty psychology and the crucial 
role that self-reflection plays in their philosophical notion of religion (More’s “boniform 
faculty,” Cudworth’s “hegemonikon,” and Peter Sterry’s “omniformity” of the soul);98 the 
promotion of man as the “measure of all things” along with an idealistic epistemology and a 
theory of representative perception;99 the notion of the world-soul as a “plastick nature” 
mediating between material and spiritual realities;100 and finally, their efforts to promote 
universal tolerance (Cudworth and Sterry played a role in Cromwell’s commission for the 
readmission of the Jews to England), all testify to the cosmic breadth of their notion of 
reform.101  
Despite these similarities, Peter Sterry is the only member of the Cambridge Platonists 
to refer explicitly to Cusanus in his writings, as Eric Parker demonstrates in his chapter in this 
volume, though Ralph Cudworth owned a copy the Basil (1565) edition of Cusanus’ Opera 
Omnia.102 Sterry’s acceptance and public promotion of Cusan ideas during his tenure as a 
chaplain to Oliver Cromwell and other Parliamentarians provides even further justification for 
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1687): Tercentenary Studies, ed. Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 
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ed. Hutton, 201-218; David Pailin, “Reconciling Theory and Fact: The Problem of ‘Other Faiths’ in 
Lord Herbert and the Cambridge Platonists,” in Platonism, ed. Hedley and Hutton, 93-111; and 
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Facultatibus Insignium Bibliothecæ Instructissimæ Rev. Doct. Dr. Cudworth (London: Edward 
Millington, 1691), 1.  
viewing the Cambridge Platonists in light of Cusanus’ reform of perspective. Many of their 
ideas, as mentioned, stem from the influence of Descartes, yet, their criticism of certain key 
aspects of Cartesianism – voluntarism, mechanism, and the method of doubt, etc. – more 
closely align them with Cusanus.103  
The chapters in this section aim to fill a gap in scholarship on Bruno and the Cambridge 
Platonists by addressing “the forgotten presence” of Cusanus in their various attempts to 
reform human perspective of the individual and the world. Luisa Brotto’s chapter “The Notion 
of Faith in the Works of Nicholas Cusanus and Giordano Bruno” analyses the radical nature of 
Giordano Bruno’s concept of epistemological faith, in which he was influenced by Cusanus.  It 
is well known that Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), the famous Italian philosopher and scientist, 
was deeply influenced by Nicholas of Cusa. Yet scholarship so far, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given Bruno’s heterodoxy, has neglected the important relation between their accounts of 
faith. From his first works Bruno shows a deep knowledge of Cusanus’ writings, frequently 
using Cusan terminology and sometimes quoting entire passages from him.  In the De umbris 
idearum Bruno states the importance of faith by almost paraphrasing the third book of the 
De docta ignorantia.  In his Spaccio de la bestia trionfante Bruno proposes a reform of religion 
and moral values, and holds trust and charity as the principles of human society.  
As Brotto points out, Cusanus’ philosophy always remains a major source for Bruno’s 
epistemology and for his conception of the search for divinity. However, Bruno’s 
interpretation of faith is not the same as Cusanus’. For, as Meredith Ziebart has argued, 
Cusanus aims at merging faith intended in an epistemological sense (as a non-rational kind of 
knowledge that can orientate human reasoning) and faith intended in a religious sense (as 
faith in God and in Christ). By contrast, Bruno omits every reference to the Christian God and 
to Christ when writing about faith. He conceives faith as a disposition of the soul that 
evaluates the activities of every faculty, thus laying the foundation of every relationship that 
man can establish with external objects. This kind of faith becomes a key element in Bruno’s 
epistemology, ethics and magic. Thus, as Brotto shows, Bruno remodels the Christian virtue 
of faith in a non-Christian philosophy, but one that is inspired to some degree by Cusanus. 
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In the second chapter “‘The Sacred Circle of All-Being’: Cusanus, Lord Brooke, and 
Peter Sterry,” Eric Parker reveals the dependence of the Cambridge Platonist, Peter Sterry on 
Cusanus’ perspectivalism. Sterry’s first employer, Robert Greville, Lord Brooke, a prominent 
Member of Parliament and general during the English Civil War, showed his support for 
universal reform in his treatise The Nature of Truth (1641). Brooke, who was among the 
sponsors of Jan Amos Comenius in his voyage to England, very likely wrote this highly Platonic 
treatise with Sterry’s aid. Brooke uses the logic of coincidence to form his central argument 
that all truths, even the contradiction of “Esse and Non-Esse,” are in reality unified in the 
ultimate Truth that descends from God.  
In his writings Sterry refers explicitly to Cusanus, making reference to De docta 
ignorantia and De coniecturis, as well as betraying a knowledge of De visione Dei and Idiota 
de mente. Like Cusanus, Sterry argues that only the “higher” kinds of intellection, such as the 
divine and angelic intellects, are set above the “wall of Paradise” as Cusanus describes it in De 
visione dei. Sterry appeals to Cusanus’ Trinitarian names (Unity, Equality, and Union) to 
explains his own understanding of the “arithmetical Trinity.” He promotes this ‘glass’ of the 
Trinity as the proper lens for viewing all of reality. Parker shows that for Brooke and Sterry, 
the Cusan logic of coincidence initiates a conversion of perspective as it persuades the soul to 
agree, “Ne te quaesiveris extra.” Most importantly, the acceptance of coincidence provides 
for a broader sense of tolerance and freedom in the individual as well as society as it limits 
human ambition, specifically the quest for absolute certainty in matters of religion and 
politics. Thus, Brooke and Sterry represent two prominent and influential proponents of the 
idea of “coincidence” as the means to universal reform and peace in seventeenth-century 
England. 
In his chapter “Varieties of Spiritual Sense: Cusanus and John Smith” Derek Michaud 
offers a window into the theologies of Cusanus and the Cambridge Platonist John Smith 
(1618-52) by illuminating their contrasting appropriations of Origen’s concept of the spiritual 
senses. Both early modern Neoplatonists of sorts, they evince many common concerns even 
while a definitive link between them remains elusive. The idea of spiritual sensation, common 
in mystical theology, is essential to a proper account of Christian experience not adequately 
addressed by the scholasticism of their times. While both Cusanus and Smith use the language 
of spiritual sensation throughout their extant works, their understandings thereof are 
markedly different. Each appropriated and reformulated the spiritual senses to meet their 
intellectual and religious contexts.  
Cusa attempted what has been called a synthesis of Aristotelian and Origenist 
aesthetics while Smith’s Reformed Neoplatonism led him to reject peripatetic philosophy 
outright. For Cusanus, spiritual sensation is a fundamentally apophatic process whereby we 
come to “see that we do not see” which points back to the sacramental practices and 
eschatological hope of the Catholic Church. For Smith, spiritual sensation is a direct and 
personal kataphatic process whereby we leave unfitting modes of perception behind in 
exchange for the divine intellect within us. For the Cardinal, ordinary sense perception, 
including contemplating images, is central. But this sacramental showing includes hiddenness 
within itself. For this reason spiritual sensation supplies a mediated ‘foretaste’ of things only 
fully revealed in the eschatological future. Smith, on the other hand, allows little to no positive 
role for ordinary sense perception. Instead, he emphasizes that spiritual sensation is an 
intellectual matter more or less achievable in this life. Both sought to reform the Origenist 
tradition for their own situations sure that contemplation of the divine is more tasted than 
calculated. 
In the final chapter in this section “Motion, Space and Early Modern Re-formations of 
the Cosmos: Nicholas of Cusa’s Anima Mundi and Henry More’s Spirit of Nature” Nathan 
Strunk examines the efforts of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, to reform our 
perspective of the cosmos. In the “Parable of the Madman” Nietzsche famously describes how 
Copernicus’ decentering of the earth culminated in its desacralisation so that humanity having 
“unchained this earth from its sun…are straying as through an infinite nothing.” Yet, as Louis 
Dupré argues in his book by the same title, while the “passage to modernity” may have torn 
the theo-cosmic synthesis of the middle ages asunder, thinkers like Cusanus “anticipated and 
avoided the problems a heliocentric picture would cause to the traditional religious 
worldview by rethinking the relationship between God and nature.” This is particularly true 
of Cusanus’ transposition of the traditional notion of God’s omnipresence with the help of 
the Platonic notion of a “world-soul.”   
In book II of De docta ignorantia, Cusanus describes how the world-soul unfolds the 
divine mind by actualizing potentiality through the medium of motion.  Around two hundred 
years after Cusanus, Henry More also sought to rethink the relationship between God and 
nature after Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo.  Significantly, he does so by advancing a doctrine 
of the “universal soul of the world,” which he calls “the spirit of nature.” In More’s Immortality 
of the Soul, the “spirit of nature” names God’s immediate contact with the world for 
communicating motion to matter. Comparing Cusanus and More shows that as science 
“progressed” they accommodated it by appropriating notions as ancient as Plato’s “world-
soul.” For neither of them does the fact that the world is perpetually moving and adrift in the 
universe mean it is estranged from the divine. Rather, the motion of the unchained planet 
further instances God’s intimate, omnipresent relation with a living, interconnected world. 
The pursuit of docta ignorantia, and its radical change in epistemological perspective, 
provides a persuasive lens through which to view Cusanus’ forgotten presence in the early 
modern world, particularly in the thought of Bruno and the Cambridge Platonists. These 
essays point to differing conclusions regarding the reform of perspective among these figures, 
yet their rejection of the medieval hierarchical universe, their criticism of Aristotelian method 
and their promotion of Neoplatonism, as well as their turn to the natural principles of reason 
as the “Candle of the Lord,” reveal similarities with Cusanus’ radical perspectivalism.  
 
PART IV. Mathesis Universalis: Reform of Method  
 
The papers in the fourth section on ‘Method’ explore Cusanus’ impact on the early modern 
reform of method.  Importantly, all the papers are connected by the theme of the “universal 
reformation,” which in recent years, through the work of scholars such as Joseph Freedman, 
Howard Hotson and Vladímir Urbánek, has emerged as a vital category for understanding 
early modernity and its connected intellectual, scientific and religious revolutions.104  Like the 
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various types of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century reformatio, the notion of universal reform 
has the advantage of being rooted in the language and consciousness of its age – as a 
hermeneutic of modernity it arises from within modernity itself.  Significantly, it also 
embraces within itself all of the other major categories of reform surveyed in this volume.   
Indeed, despite their many differences, the universal reformers all shared the conviction – 
well exemplified by Cusanus – that without a fundamental reorientation of epistemological 
and metaphysical perspectives there could be no chance of establishing lasting social, political 
or ecclesial reform.105 
As the term suggests, universal reformation referred to the desire for a 
comprehensive and complete reformation of contemporary Church and society, going 
beyond the partial and incomplete reformations of the previous two centuries.  Universal 
reform was thus intended to reach broader and deeper than anything that had gone before 
it, towards its ultimate goal of the reform of the human spirit itself.  Fundamental to this was 
the concept of a universal idea, or universal pattern, of reform located in the divine mind and 
accessible to humanity through a variety of channels.106  What all the diverse streams that 
make up universal reformation shared in common therefore, was some kind of dynamic 
convergence between epistemology, ontology and theology.  In this sense, as Jan Patočka 
insightfully recognised, there was an important connection between universal reform and the 
Realism and exemplarism of Cusanus’ own age of the fifteenth century.107 Indeed, perhaps in 
no other age was Ladner’s “idea” of reform articulated so explicitly as in the late medieval 
and early modern period.108 
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Yet what made universal reformation particularly distinctive was the way in which the 
notion of method became the centre of this convergence.  It is for this reason that scholarship 
on universal reform has focused so much attention on methodological movements such as 
Ramism and Lullism.109  For while at first sight these may appear to be only on the periphery 
of the intellectual “high culture” of their age, on closer inspection their concerns turn out to 
register right at the very centre of its consciousness.  One need only think of Descartes’ 
epochal Discours de la méthode to understand the valence of method in the seventeenth 
century.  Yet what is fascinating, as Paolo Rossi and others have demonstrated, is the way in 
which the philosophical projects of Descartes, Bacon, Leibniz and other luminaries of the 
seventeenth century can be seen to be motivated at the deepest level by methodological 
concerns first raised by the Ramists and Lullists themselves.110 
In many ways the same can also be said of the new mathematical awareness of the 
century, in which methodological, mathematical and philosophical concerns became 
entwined in the all-encompassing quest for mathesis universalis.  While it is true that the links 
between universal reformation and mathesis universalis have not yet been adequately 
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mapped out – something this volume in fact hopes to address – it is evident that in Ramus 
himself, as well as in Lullists such as Jacuqes Lefèvre d’Étaples and Charles de Bovelles, we 
see the beginnings of a new and influential alliance between mathematics, philosophy and 
pedagogy.111  Significantly, this carried through into the Ramist-Lullist encyclopaedism of the 
seventeenth century, which as Rossi and others have demonstrated had intimate connections 
with the parallel movement of mathesis universalis, especially as it was conceived in the 
fertile minds of Jan Amos Comenius and Leibniz himself.112 
That one of the most important figures in this line of succession was Cusanus himself 
is beyond doubt.  Not only was Cusanus strongly influenced by Lull and the Lullist thought of 
his friend and mentor Heimeric de Campo, as studies by Eusebio Colomer, Rudolf Haubst, 
Charles Lohr and others have all shown, but he himself was crucial in the transmission of the 
revolutionary new Lullist worldview to early modernity.113  For this reason Lohr places 
Cusanus centre-stage in his breathtaking narrative of the emergence of early modern 
metaphysics.114  Likewise, Maria Rosa Antognazza, drawing on Thomas Leinkauf, has argued 
convincingly that he was a crucial mediator between Renaissance Platonism, universal reform 
and early modern thought.  Indeed, Antognazza’s work especially has served to reconnect the 
philosophical and theological trajectories of universal reform, establishing this as a key 
“missing link” between the medieval world of Lull and Cusanus and the early modern world 
                                               
111  See Joseph Victor, Charles de Bovelles, 1479-1553: An Intellectual Biography (Geneva: Droz, 1978), 
57-72, 129-31, 150, 160; Richard Oosterhoff, “Idiotae, Mathematics, and Artisans: The Untutored 
Mind and the Discovery of Nature in the Fabrist Circle,” Intellectual History Review 24:3 (2014): 
301-19; Nelly Bruyère, Méthode et Dialectique dans l’oeuvre de la Ramée: Renaissance et Age 
Classique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1984) and Robert Goulding, Defending Hypatia: Ramus, Savile and the 
Renaissance Rediscovery of Mathematical History (New York: Springer, 2000), 35-74. 
112  See, for example, Rossi, Logic, 130-44, 176-94.  On the early modern movement of mathesis 
universalis and its prehistory see especially David Rabouin, Mathesis Universalis: L’Idée de 
“Mathématique Universelle d’Aristote á Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009). 
113  For earlier discussion of this see Rudolf Haubst, “Zum Fortleben Alberts des Grossen bei Heymeric 
von Kamp und Nikolaus von Kues,” Studia Albertina (1952): 420-47; Eusebio Colomer, Nikolaus 
von Kues und Raimund Llull aus Handschriften der Kueser Bibliothek (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1961); 
and Charles Lohr, “Ramon Lull und Nikolaus von Kues. Zu einem Strukturvergleich ihres Denkens,” 
Theologie und Philosophie 56 (1981): 218-31.  Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest in 
Cusanus’ relation to Heimeric, as may be seen in publications such as Klaus Reinhardt, Harald 
Schwaetzer and Franz-Bernard Stammkötter (eds.), Heymericus de Campo: Philosophie und 
Theologie im 15. Jahrhundert (Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag, 2009) and Florian Hamann, Das 
Siegel der Ewigheit: Universalwissenschaft und Konziliarismus bei Heymericus de Campo (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 2006), 230-57. 
114  Charles Lohr, “Metaphysics,” in Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt 
and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 537-99. 
of Leibniz.115  More recently, the pioneering work of David Albertson has identified in 
Cusanus’ thought the beginnings of a fifteenth-century Renaissance in Christian 
Pythagoreanism and mathematical theology, the extent and influence of which remains to be 
charted.116  This only reinforces the pressing need for a detailed re-evaluation of Cusanus’ 
reform thought and its multi-faceted legacy. 
Continuing and developing these themes the papers in this section argue for Cusanus’ 
place right at the heart of the early modern movements of universal reform and mathesis 
universalis.  Significantly, the papers follow a line of historical succession which Lohr, 
Antognazza and others have reconstructed.  For going beyond Cassirer they have been able 
to provide a convincing and historically-documentable chain of influence stretching from the 
fourteenth century through to the end of the seventeenth century.117  This focuses on two 
intimately-connected intellectual movements – the sixteenth-century Parisian circle around 
Lefèvre d’Étaples and the seventeenth-century Herborn circle around Johann Heinrich Alsted.  
For, as Antognazza notes, despite the “confessional, geographical and chronological distance” 
separating them, these were unified by their common grounding in the thought of Lull and 
Cusanus.   Indeed, both circles were vital in disseminating Lull’s and Cusa’s works to early 
modern European readers.118 Together they may therefore be seen as twin “epicentres” of 
universal reform, from which Cusanus’ influence radiated out all over early modern Europe, 
in the process crossing intellectual, theological and confessional borders. 
The focus of Richard Oosterhoff’s chapter “‘Our Boethius’ and Cusan Mathematical 
Theology in the Early French Reform” is on Antognazza’s first epicentre – the Fabrist circle of 
Lefèvre d’Étaples.  Drawing attention to their programme of patristic and medieval 
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ressourcement, which saw the publication of major editions of Boethius, the Victorines, Lull 
and of course Cusanus himself in the celebrated Opera Omnia of 1514, he argues that at its 
heart was an ambitious attempt to bridge the arts and theology.  In doing so the Fabrists 
hoped to initiate a comprehensive reform of both philosophy and theology with important 
implications for both the academy and the Church.  The inspiration for this programme lay in 
Boethius, whose works provided tantalising hints of what such a mathematical theology might 
look like, but it was Cusanus especially who provided them with their key notion of the 
“mathematical Trinity.”  In focusing on their reception of this notion, Oosterhoff explores the 
way in which the Fabrist Circle deployed Cusan mathematical theology in their ill-fated 
attempts to reform the diocese of Meaux, with its far-reaching consequences for the French 
evangelical movement and the French Reformation itself. 
Roberta Giubilini’s chapter “Nicholas Cusanus and Guillaume Postel on Learning and 
Docta Ignorantia,” focuses on Guillaume Postel, the visionary French reformer and prophet 
of “universal concordance” who has been called by Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann “one of the 
most interesting intellectual figures” of the sixteenth century.119  Postel was influenced by the 
Fabrists and a number of scholars have noticed his profound affinities with Cusanus, but 
Giubilini’s chapter is the first to investigate their relationship in depth.  While highlighting 
important connections in their understanding of the universal harmony of religions and 
cultures, their focus on the problem of mediation between God and men and their fascination 
with rational apologetic for the Trinity, especially in Christianity’s engagement with Islam, 
Giubilini focuses on their joint desire to uncover the process of human learning.  In particular, 
she demonstrates how Postel appropriates, albeit in a very different context and for different 
purposes, Cusanus’ linguistic and mathematical approaches to knowledge and above all his 
ideal of docta ignorantia. 
Jan Amos Comenius, the focus of the third and fourth chapters in this section, is a 
major figure in the universal reformation.  As the outstanding representative of the Herborn 
Circle – Antognazza’s second epicentre – he was an inheritor of both the Ramist and Lullist 
traditions.  Moreover, as scholars such as Patočka, Pavel Floss, Simon Kuchlbauer and others 
have recognised, his pansophic project of universal reform was deeply influenced by Cusanus, 
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whose thought he encountered at a formative stage in his intellectual development.120  Petr 
Pavlas’ chapter “The Book Metaphor Reformed, that is Triadised: A Layman’s Bible and God’s 
Books in Raymond of Sabunde, Nicholas of Cusa and Jan Amos Comenius” explores the Lullist 
and Cusan influence on Comenius’ understanding of the three books of nature, Scripture and 
the human mind – a central, unifying notion in his pansophia.  From its roots in patristic and 
medieval theologians he traces the development of the understanding of the “book of 
nature” in the fifteenth-century Lullist Raymond of Sabunde, whose ideas were a major 
influence on the Fabrist Circle, and in Cusanus himself.  Sabunde’s own role as a pioneer in 
the development of natural theology is well known – if only through the ironic lens of Michel 
de Montaigne’s famous Apologie de Raymond Sebond – but Pavlas explores the way in which 
Cusanus transforms the Sabundian pattern of natural theology by his influential connection 
of the book of nature and the book of the mind.  In doing so he not only helped prepare the 
way for the key early modern understanding of nature as a book designed to be read by 
humans – a development which proved so influential on the mathematical and scientific 
understanding of the time – but he also laid the groundwork for Comenius’ own attempt to 
order European, and ultimately global, society according to the rule of the three books. 
Comenius’ pansophia and its connection to both his Trinitarian theology and his quest 
to develop a mathesis universalis is the principal theme of Simon Burton’s chapter “‘Squaring 
the Circle’: Cusan Metaphysics and the Pansophic Vision of Jan Amos Comenius.”  Drawing on 
the recent scholarship of Kuchlbauer, this situates Comenius’ pansophic project squarely in 
the context of his anti-Socinian writings.121  In particular, it argues that Comenius drew deeply 
on Cusanus’ metaphysics of enfolding and unfolding and his programmatic notion of the 
coincidence of opposites in order to construct an epistemology in which reason opens 
upwards through sense and Scripture towards the transcendent mystery of the Triune God.  
In this way the Cusan coincidence of opposites comes to encode for Comenius a “logic of 
faith” responsive to the Trinitarian and participatory structure of reality, expressing God as 
the transcendent and immanent ground of all creation.   Burton then explores the way in 
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which Comenius takes up this understanding, through the mathematical motif of squaring the 
circle, into his developing pansophia.  In his later works this led him to attempt a fusion of 
Augustinian and Cusan methodologies in order to develop an alternative mathesis universalis 
– one which affirms with Descartes and the new philosophy the mathematical structure of all 
reality, but always remains open to its Trinitarian and transcendent ground.  In this he seeks 
to establish his own Christian Enlightenment, treading with Cusanus an alternative “passage 
to modernity.” 
The final chapter in this concluding section by Jan Makovský on “Cusanus and Leibniz: 
Symbolic Explorations of Infinity as a Ladder to God” is devoted to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 
a quintessential Enlightenment figure.  As remarked on above, Leibniz’s connection to both 
the Fabrist and Herborn circles is now well established.  Indeed, following the pioneering 
scholarship of Willy Kabitz, Leroy Loemker and Rossi, leading Leibniz scholars such as Leinkauf, 
Antognazza and Christia Mercer have emphasised the centrality of Renaissance 
Neoplatonism, Encyclopaedism and the universal reformation for understanding Leibniz’s 
philosophy and theology.122  Nevertheless, Leibniz’s relation to Cusanus remains a neglected 
topic, despite a widespread acknowledgement of Cusanus’ own important role in the 
centuries-long refinement of geometrical ideas that eventually led to the development of the 
calculus.123  In light of this Makovský explores the connections between Cusanus’ 
mathematical theology and Leibniz’s own reflections on infinity as a ladder to God.  Taking up 
again Cusanus’ understanding of squaring the circle, he shows how Leibniz’s famous 
mathematical investigations of infinity may be understood as a symbolic comprehension and 
rationalisation of Cusanus’ rule of learned ignorance.  In doing so he argues that Leibniz’s 
Cusan-inspired notion of infinity became a means for him to implement a reform of science 
and philosophy, transcending what he viewed as the deadening rationalism of Cartesian 
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natural science.  As with Comenius, this had important consequences for what Leibniz called 
the “perfect republic of spirits” – in other words for the Church. 124  In this we have come full 
circle, albeit now in a very different confessional context, back to the Cusanus of the De 
concordantia catholica and his irenic vision of the universal harmony of angels and men in the 
bonds of the Trinity. 
 
PART V. Epilogue 
 
As a Christian reformer, Cusanus was well aware that reform always exists within the horizon 
of time and eternity.  Indeed, according to Ladner’s paradigm, reform must always be 
perfectible since it conforms to an ultimately transcendent pattern.125 At the same time, as 
we may see from his early Conjectura de ultimis diebus, Cusanus’ own efforts at reform, like 
those of Luther, Comenius and the universal reformers, were driven by his apocalyptic 
expectations.126 Fittingly, this eschatological element of reform frames Michael Moore’s 
epilogue to our volume.  Taking us back to the turbulent era of the Weimar Republic, under 
the looming shadow of its false messianism, Moore argues that the work of prominent 
medievalists and Renaissance scholars such as Aby Warburg, Raymond Klibansky, Erwin 
Panofsky and above all Ernst Cassirer was motivated not only by historical interests but also 
by a desire to resource the intellectual and spiritual reconstruction of the contemporary 
German, and indeed European, ethos.  While Cassirer, unlike Cusanus, was not a “Messianic 
thinker,” his meticulous historical research made him thoroughly attuned to the enduring 
vitality of cultural forms.  In particular, he was deeply attracted to Cusanus’ innovative 
synthesis of transcendence and freedom, as well as his emphasis on the dignity of the 
individual human being.  More than simply a key figure in the emergence of modernity, 
Cusanus came to represent for him the modern spirit in one of its purest and most elevated 
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forms.  As Moore reminds us, such thinking remains just as relevant to us today in our own 
historical moment of kairos.  By raising anew the question of Cusanus and (early) modernity, 
our volume also reveals him as a figure of enduring relevance, whose significance far 
transcends the bounds of his own era, indeed, perhaps, of any era. 
 
 
